Study Design. Retrospective study of benchmarking database. Objective. To evaluate the variability in direct costs of spinal implants across various academic medical centers, determining variability between and within specific manufacturers, and to measure the relationship between purchasing volume and price. Summary of Background Data. Spinal implants are a significant component of the cost of surgery. There is an absence of transparency of how much various medical centers in the United States pay for implants because of the use of nondisclosure agreements as part of price negotiations. Transparency of information on costs and awareness of costs by physicians will be useful in managing costs in a value-based health care economy. Methods. Purchasing records of 45 academic medical centers over a 12-month period were examined. Purchasing volume and unit pricing for pedicle screws (PS), anterior cervical plates (ACP), and transforaminal lumbar interbody fusion (TLIF) cages were collected for 6 manufacturers. Overall variation in implant costs across centers and for each manufacturer was determined as was the relationship between purchasing volume and unit price. Results. We found variation in implant costs between medical centers, and between manufacturers for PS, ACP and TLIF similar to joint replacement implants. Regression analysis showed that for each 10-fold increase in purchasing volume, the unit price decreased by $126 for PS, $242 for ACP, and $789 for TLIF.
I
ncreasing health care costs pose a significant challenge to sustainability of our health care economy and patient access. New technology development is an important driver of health care costs in the United States and may add cost without a concordant improvement in outcome. 1 Spinal instrumentation is used for fusion surgeries indicated for cases of fracture, deformity, malignancies, and degenerative conditions with instability. The success of surgical treatment of degenerative spinal disorders coupled with increased demands of a growing aging population has resulted in an increase in utilization rates for spinal surgery. [2] [3] [4] [5] From 1992 to 2001, rates of surgery increased 53%, and from 2002 to 2007 the rates of complex spinal fusion increased significantly, beyond the rate of rise of other common orthopedic procedures. 6, 7 Between 2002 and 2004, the annual cost of treating musculoskeletal health conditions was $510 billion, equivalent to 4.6% of the US gross domestic product (GDP) with indirect costs totaling nearly $850 billion (7.7% of GDP). 8 Implanted medical devices are a significant component of overall costs of care, and in the United States, the annual expenditure on medical devices is up to $80 billion. A large proportion of this cost was attributed to orthopedic implants, which in 2012 accounted for $23 billion, or nearly 5% of total costs of musculoskeletal care. 9 In spinal fusions, implant costs may comprise nearly half of the direct costs of care. 10 The US spinal implant market is now in excess of $6.8 billion, a startling 30 times larger than it was in 1994.
Spine surgery is characterized by significant variation in rates of surgery, surgical techniques, and costs of care. The presence of variability in rates and techniques indicates that there is neither a consensus nor evidence-based approach to the management of common spinal disorders, and where one lives may determine the likelihood of undergoing surgery. 12, 13 Reasons behind this variation in utilization remain elusive, however, number of surgeons, surgical training, and financial considerations have been suggested. 12, 14, 15 While the cost effectiveness of many spinal surgeries has been well established, there has been little attention to the costs of implants. 16, 17 Opacity of information on price and cost creates significant disruption in the market forces that would influence price based upon supply and demand. In most medical center and vendor contracts, the parties negotiate the prices and enter into agreements that prohibit disclosure of prices to others. Nondisclosure agreements have been estimated to affect up to 60% of the overall costs of implants. 18 While Hahn et al have argued that price transparency could lead to increased prices as it facilitates industry collusion to keep prices high, 19 studies by Pauly and Burns cast significant doubt upon this argument. 20 There is also strong evidence that surgeons have little awareness of the cost of implants that they choose. 21, 22 A purchase and reimbursement system in which the surgeon chooses the implant, the hospital pays for the implant, and the manufacturer markets to the surgeon and creates significant malalignment between the hospital and the physician regarding price sensitivity and the ability to control costs.
The purpose of this study was to determine the variability in implant costs used in spinal fusion procedures between US academic medical centers. Specifically, we first aimed to quantify the variation between centers and manufacturers for the common spinal implants pedicle screws (PS), transforaminal lumbar interbody fusion cages (TLIF), and anterior cervical plates (ACP). Second, we aimed to explore the relationships between implant price and utilization volume.
MATERIALS AND METHODS

Data Source
Academic medical centers in the United States anonymously report implant cost information to the University Health Consortium (UHC), a consortium of academic medical centers and their affiliated hospitals. Participation and benchmarking from the UHC has historically only been available to financial departments within medical centers, however, medical center partnerships with surgeons, in an effort to improve transparency and reduce costs, have allowed for surgeon access to these data.
The UHC database collects data from 116 academic medical centers (261 of their affiliated hospitals) representing 90% of nonprofit academic medical centers across the United States. Using implant cost records from UHC (April/ May 2011 to April/May 2012), we determined the hospital charges for PS, single-level ACP, and TLIF cages. The variables available were the quantity of units purchased, the unit prices, the time period over which the units were purchased, and the total spending for the time period specified. Only manufacturers providing implants to 5 or more centers were included. All centers with available purchasing records of aforementioned implant types were included. Some records stretched over 3 months of the year, some over 6 months, and some over the full year. In these cases, we extrapolated the quantity purchased over 12 months by assuming that the rate of purchasing was constant throughout the year. For example, if a center had reported a 3-month period of having purchased 12 implants, we extrapolated this to 12 months by multiplying by four, assuming that 48 implants had been purchased over the 12-month period. To further validate this method, we performed simple analysis of variance (ANOVA) between the 3-, 6-, and 12-month groups' purchasing volumes in order to determine if there was any statistically significant difference. Individual medical centers were not identified by name and we used an anonymous coding scheme at random for manufacturers (i.e., manufacturer A, manufacturer B, etc.).
Data Analysis
We performed simple univariate statistics to determine the overall variation in implant costs across centers and between each manufacturer. Because cost data was not normally distributed, the standard deviation and mean were not deemed to be the most meaningful estimators of spread and location, respectively. Therefore, we also reported the nonparametric dimensionless quartile coefficient of variation (QCV) as a measure of dispersion, calculated by
, where Q1 is the 25th percentile and Q3 is the 75th percentile. 23 The QCV is preferred when sampling from non-normal distributions in which wide outliers exist. 24 We performed analysis of variance (ANOVA) to determine if there were significant differences in the pricing between manufacturers, using a Tukey honest significant determination (HSD) adjustment with a level of significance set at P < 0.05.
Additionally, to determine the relationship between implant cost and utilization volume, we performed multivariate random-effects linear regression models. We used a logarithmic transformation for volume because the data was highly skewed. Since manufacturers may each represent only a single manufacturer from a larger population of manufacturers, we utilized a random-effects model allowing for the manufacturer to vary randomly (with varying intercept and/or slope) to quantify the amount of between-manufacturer variation (SAS Proc Mixed, SAS systems Inc., Cary, NC).
RESULTS
We obtained data from 116 academic medical centers and 8 spinal implant manufacturers. Based upon implant volume, we included 45 academic medical centers and 6 spinal implant manufacturers for the analysis. The mean cost for a single PS was $878 (range $400-$1843), for a single ACP $1068 (range $540-$2388), and for a single TLIF cage $2975 (range $938-$7200) ( Table 1 ). The QCV was 0.168, 0.198, and 0.189 for PS, ACP, and TLIF, respectively. ANOVA results showed no difference in purchasing volumes for centers with 3-, 6-, or 12-month purchasing records.
ANOVA results demonstrated significant differences in implant price between manufacturers for PS (P < 0.0043), ACP (P < 0.0001), and TLIF (P < 0.0123). In addition, there were significant pairwise differences between manufacturers for all the three implant categories (P < 0.05) (Figures 1-3 ). Nonparametric ANOVA (Wilcoxon-Rank Sum) showed similar results. Overall for all the three implant types, Manufacturer E was consistently among the highest priced. Manufacturers A and B had a tendency toward being the less costly implants for PS and TLIF.
Multivariate random-effects linear regression analysis controlling for volume showed that there was a negative relationship between the volume of units purchased and the unit price of the implants (Figures 4-6) . From our analysis, we found that for each 10-fold increase in purchasing volume, the unit price decreased by $126 per PS (P < 0.0001), $242 per ACP (P < 0.0001), and $789 per TLIF (P < 0.0001) ( Table 2 ). There was no statistically significant between-manufacturer variation in the random-effects analysis for any of the implants (P-values were 0.11, 0.12, and 0.12, respectively for PS, ACP, and TLIF).
DISCUSSION
There is high variability in the cost of surgical implants between hospitals and manufacturers. This is a reflection of the failure of normal market forces to influence price in the spinal implant microeconomy with an incomplete exchange Manufacturer pricing differences that were not statistically significant (P > 0.05) are paired in the boxes with dotted borders. All other pairwise differences in manufacturer pricing were statistically significant (P < 0.05). ACP indicates anterior cervical plates. of information on implant costs leading to a dysfunctional marketplace. In the setting of rapid and unsustainable increases in costs of care, the surgeon and hospital need to work in alignment to be aware of costs and to consider the impact of implant costs on the overall value of care. If optimizing value is the goal of an evidence-based approach to care, then knowledge and responsiveness to costs and outcomes should be a priority for surgeons and health care providers. The goals of the Affordable Care Act include improving access, limiting costs, and redistributing payment to incentivize value of care. Awareness of costs and outcomes are fundamental to a purposeful effort to optimize value. The General Accounting Office (GAO) examining the total health care costs due to orthopedic implants notes a significant variation in the price of hip and knee implants paid by various hospitals with some centers paying 78% and 83% more, respectively, than others for the same implants. 9 The dissociation of implant users, purchasers, and suppliers, and poor alignment between physicians and hospitals drive high and variable costs. Our study provides important insight into cost variation and may improve awareness and stimulate action to improve uniformity and cost containment in implant costs.
Orthopedic surgery is an implant-intensive specialty, which contributes a significant component to the total cost of care. This study is the first report of implant cost variability in spine surgery. Previous studies have reported high variation in implant costs in other areas of orthopedic surgery. A recent study by Robinson et al found that there were significant variations in total hip and knee replacement costs both within and across various hospitals even when controlling for patient diagnoses and comorbidities as well as hospital characteristics. 25 For total knee replacements, the average implant cost ranged from $1797 to $12,093 and for total hip replacements from $2392 to $12,651. This variation in implant costs was found to be the major factor in the variation in the total cost of joint replacement surgery. Our findings were similar to the data presented in this study as spine implant cost QCVs were similar to values reported for hip and knee implants (0.168, 0.198, and 0.189 for PS, ACP, and TLIF, respectively, vs. 0.198 and 0.205 for knee and hip implants, respectively).
Hospital-directed Strategies to Lower Costs
Hospital-directed strategies have demonstrated efficacy in reducing implant costs. According to Robinson et al, two specific strategies have been employed by various health systems to help manage costs of purchasing implants. 25 The first one is increasing the total volume of implants purchased from a single or limited manufacturers, and negotiating a volume-based discount in cost. This may have adverse effects of limiting surgeon choice and preference, and also access to new technologies. The second one is to set a fixed price for a device and to welcome all manufacturers who are willing to match the price threshold. Both strategies, in theory, should bring about cost-containment. 26 However, limitations remain for smaller hospitals and health care systems with less price negotiating leverage due to lower volumes. Similarly, surgeon preference for a high-cost implant may outweigh cost sensitivity. Hospitals may not reliably work toward reducing implant costs as well. Hospital contracts with payors may often omit costs of implants, and implants may be reimbursed at a significant premium over hospital costs. Overall, alignment between surgeon, hospital, and payor as stakeholders in implant pricing and selection is necessary to drive cost reduction and optimize value in providing care for patients with spinal disorders.
Cost-containment Programs
Zuckerman et al examined the effects of an integrated costcontainment program at one hospital and showed that it was possible to significantly reduce overall costs of a joint replacement procedure. 27 One of the main phases of the program included initiating a competitive bidding system to select standard prostheses that would be available for general use within the institution. They also established a prosthesis-utilization committee to monitor the use of the standardized implants and to make decisions on the use of nonstandard prostheses. While this program limited surgeon choice and independence in terms of implant selection, it was found to have an average overall cost reduction of 14% and 24% for total hip and knee implants, respectively. Burns et al studied the influences on surgeon implant decision making. 28 They examined the surgeons' relationship with their preferred manufacturer, looking for financial payments, tenure with the manufacturer, and use of the manufacturer's implants during residency. They also examined how receptive each surveyed surgeon was to hospital cost-containment efforts. The conclusion was that surgeons tended to align more closely with the manufacturer sales representatives and much less with the hospital purchasing manager. However, many surgeons did support hospital cost-containment efforts, especially in limiting the number of different manufacturers.
The overall trend in strategies to target cost-containment specifically aimed at implant costs has focused on creating efficiency and more favorable costs by using conventional methods such as limiting the number of choices available, setting price controls, and standardizing the use of implants. However, the issue of price variability in the same types of implants across different purchasers has not been adequately addressed and remains an important target for future cost-containment efforts. In this study we have shown that while the prices of implants do decrease with larger volumes purchased, there is still high variability with different hospitals paying widely different prices for the same implant, albeit not significantly different from hip or knee replacements. Furthermore, a great deal of variability exists in the range of pricing for the same type of implant across the 6 manufacturers examined. Because of this variability, methods of purchasing and price negotiations should be examined as part of an overall strategy of cost containment on the behalf of hospitals.
There are several limitations to this study. First, all medical centers were anonymously reported in the data obtained from the UHC. This did not allow for checking how representative the sample was of the nation's health care providers. However, since the UHC is one of the largest consortia of academic centers nationwide, with members from all major regions of the country, this sample most likely does represent the United States geographically. Second, it is possible that the large variability in implant costs between manufacturers can be attributed to differing implant features justifying their higher cost, which is not evident in the data reported. However, the study aims to evaluate price differences of the same types of implants rather than examining their clinical efficacy. Third, purchasing records for some of the centers were only available for part of the year examined. In these cases we assumed a similar purchasing volume throughout the entire year by extrapolating the data as described. While there is a potential for systematic differences between centers reporting over different periods, our sensitivity analysis found no statistical difference. Fourth, while the data contains relatively few variables which limits certain analyses (regional differences, effect of center size and surgical volume, etc.) it does provide a glimpse of some aspects of implant costs which are yet to be made public.
CONCLUSION
In this analysis of implant cost data from a consortium of academic medical centers, we found variation in spinal implant costs to be similar to hip and knee replacements with a relatively weak relationship between volume and cost. While a higher utilization volume was associated with slightly lower unit costs, a significant number of centers had higher costs despite high use. In the current model of implant selection by surgeon and hospital paying the charge, there is a clear disconnect and malalignment of price responsiveness. Transparency in cost negotiation, surgeon awareness of costs, and alignment between surgeon and hospital goals may help decrease the cost of spinal implants, and the cost of care for patients undergoing instrumented fusions.
Key Points
Increasing costs associated with health care in the United States necessitates cost-containment. Spinal instrumentation costs are a significant driver of cost increases. Methods of implant pricing involve nondisclosure agreements that may preclude competitive pricing between manufacturers.
There is a significant variation in implant costs with a small negative relationship between volume and cost. Higher utilization volume is associated with lower unit costs, but there are a significant number of centers that pay higher prices despite high use.
